












Since the end of the Cold War, the study of European defence has been 
dominated by a ‘CSDP-centric’ approach, while largely neglecting the 
comparative analysis of national defence policies. This article makes the 
case for turning the dominant research prism of European defence 
studies upside down by returning the analytical precedence to the 
national level. This approach privileges the comparative analysis of 
national defence policies and armed forces, before focusing on the 
trans-/supra-national level. The case for this conceptual turn is made in 
three steps. First, it addresses the different historical stages in European 
defence integration and the transformation of national armed forces in 
Europe. Second, it questions the predominance of CSDP in the 
scholarly literature on European defence. Finally, it seeks to 
demonstrate the fruitfulness of such a demarche by empirically 
substantiating common patterns and intra-European divergences in the 
evolution of national defence policies and armed forces since the end 
of the Cold War. In conclusion, the article suggests avenues for research 
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Introduction 
In summer 2016, the European Union (EU) released A Global Strategy for its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Under the heading “Security and Defence”, it calls on Europeans to “take greater 
responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves 
against external threats” (EU, 2016; see also Council of European Union, 2016). This is probably the 
boldest among a number of the strategy’s ambitions. Even though some leading European foreign and 
security policy pundits have tried to portray the document as a good starting point to make the CFSP 
more effective (Biscop, 2016), its weaknesses and unrealistic call for “strategic autonomy” have attracted 
sharp criticism (Techau, 2016).1 Despite the EU’s foreign and security policy achievements, notably 
within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), strategic autonomy remains a distant ideal. Not only has European defence 
integration been limited (Hyde-Price 2018), but it is also evident that the era of enthusiasm for European 
security and defence following the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998 (Joint Declaration, 
1998) and, especially, the first and preceding EU security strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World – of 
2003 (EU, 2003) has ebbed away (Fiott 2014: 11-12; Rynning 2014). Moreover, the European project 
itself has come under increasing pressure and Britain, one of Europe’s major military powers, is in the 
process of exiting the union (Heuser, 2017; Kienzle and Hallams, 2016; Lequesne 2018). Ultimately, and 
despite the questioning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategic rationale after the 
end of the Cold War, the US-backed Atlantic Alliance has remained the cornerstone of European defence 
and armed forces transformation (King 2011: 61; Terriff, Osinga and Farrell, 2010), and has even 
extended its security umbrella well beyond the former Iron Curtain (German 2017).  
In light of the still limited defence integration in Europe, this article makes the case for turning 
the dominant, ‘CSDP-centric’ research prism of European defence studies upside down by returning the 
analytical precedence to the national level. This conceptual approach privileges the comparative analysis 
of national defence policies and armed forces, before focusing on the trans-/supra-national level for two 
interconnected reasons. The first one is historical. Since the end of the Cold War, defence and security 
policy in Europe has witnessed two concurrent trends towards European integration and national 
transformation. On the one hand, European defence integration through the ESDP/CSDP (hereafter 
CSDP) has undergone a pattern of emergence, rise, and gridlock during the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s 
respectively. Despite significant institutional development, the political and military reach of CSDP 
remains limited and hampered by diverging national interests (Major and Mölling, 2013; Simón, 2017a, 
2017b). Moreover, while national security concerns and priorities have always trumped European defence 
integration since the end of the Cold War, Europe has recently witnessed a trend towards a 
renationalisation of defence policy (Keohane 2016). In this article, renationalisation refers to the renewed 
focus on territorial defence and the related national defence capabilities, the ever-decreasing enthusiasm 
for European defence integration and, as a corollary, a clear return to defence cooperation through 
NATO and a growing reliance on ad hoc minilateral arrangements. On the other hand, Europe’s national 
defence policies and armed forces have experienced significant qualitative, quantitative, and 
organisational changes in response to NATO’s US-dominated transformation agenda, a resurgent Russia, 
transnational terrorism, cyber-security challenges, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs), civil wars and neighbouring failing states. Accordingly, the combination of the rise and decline 
of the CSDP on the one hand, and of persistent national defence transformation throughout the post-
Cold War period on the other, calls for a renewed attention to national defence policy as the analytical 
starting point in the study of European defence and security. 
The second reason pertains to the extant literature on European defence. In this twin movement 
of European defence integration and national transformation, the literature has overwhelmingly 
privileged the CSDP at the expense of the cross-European comparative study of national defence policies 
and armed forces. In fact, an inverse correlation exists between, on the one hand, the relative depth and 
breadth of historical change in European defence integration versus national defence policies and, on the 
                                                     
1 For a discussion of the EU ‘Global Strategy’, see also the different contributions in Dijkstra, 2016. 
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other, the extent to which they have been respectively covered in the literature. Despite the limited scope 
of the CSDP and the persistence in the process of national defence transformation since the end of the 
Cold War, the literature on European defence has been dominated by a focus on the CSDP, and by a 
neglect of the comparative study of national defence policies and armed forces in Europe. The time is 
thus ripe to lift the ‘fog’ of European defence integration, which has distracted from the more significant 
national-centred defence cooperation in Europe.  
Addressing this imbalance by re-emphasizing the crucial importance of cross-European 
comparisons of national defence policies and armed forces does not equate to abandoning the study of 
the CSDP and of the trans-European integrative patterns in the field of defence and security. Instead of 
discarding the in-depth study of the CSDP, this article argues that a renewed focus on the national level 
allows to unearth the fundamental challenges and obstacles that have hampered European defence 
integration. Reinvigorating the national level as a key unit of analysis, and in a comparative approach, is 
in fact a condition sine qua non for investigating defence cooperation in its multiple configurations 
(bilateral, minilateral, multilateral) and levels (intergovernmental and trans-/supra-national), but without 
losing track of the foundational dimension of the national level. Despite the overwhelming focus on the 
literature on the CSDP, it has in reality only played a relatively limited role within the complex patchwork 
of national defence policies and of bilateral and mini-/multi-lateral arrangements that compose Europe’s 
security architecture.  
In light of the imbalance between the historical record and the focus of the extant literature, the 
aim of this article is to make the case for refocusing the attention on, and giving analytical precedence to, 
national defence policy and armed forces in Europe in three steps. The first addresses the different 
historical stages in the rise and decline of CSDP and in the continued transformation of national armed 
forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The second then questions the seemingly unjustified 
predominance of CSDP vis-à-vis the comparative study of national defence policies in the literature on 
European defence. The third section seeks to demonstrate the fruitfulness of such a demarche by 
empirically substantiating common patterns and intra-European divergences in the evolution of national 
defence policies and armed forces since the end of the Cold War. The article concludes by suggesting 
some avenues of future research in the study of European defence and security through a focus on 
national defence policies and armed forces. 
Conceptually, turning the dominant analytical lens upside down permits to address hitherto 
unanswered questions. The  comparative analysis of national defence policies and armed forces is notably 
key to comprehending the national security preferences that underpin the European defence cooperation 
patterns?? within and between NATO and the EU member states; the relative importance of NATO and 
the EU as enablers and shapers of the defence policies and the transformation of armed forces of 
European states; the various forms of bilateral, minilateral, and sub-regionally specific defence 
cooperation arrangements in Europe; the national preferences for different frameworks to launch military 
operations – bilateral, minilateral, NATO, EU, and/or UN; and the role of neutrals or militarily non-
aligned countries in European defence. Yet, ultimately, the reframing of European defence studies should 
allows to know the component parts in order to understand the whole, namely to study first the national 
defence policies and armed forces of European major, medium and lesser powers, and then how their 
differences and similarities have affected defence cooperation in Europe. Only this reversed but logically 
coherent analytical process from the component parts to the whole allows us to understand the shortfalls 
of European defence and why a truly integrated European defence has so far remained an elusive quest. 
 
Chronological Convergence vs. Qualitative Divergence 
The evolution of Europe’s national defence policies and armed forces since the end of the Cold War has 
been closely connected to, and frequently been overshadowed by European defence integration. This 
should not come as a surprise, because the overcoming of the Cold War order went hand in hand with 
European integration. The processes of European defence integration and national armed forces 
transformation largely converged chronologically but diverged qualitatively. The EU, its member states, 
and the other European powers have shared the same regional threat environment, albeit with sub-
regional and local differences, and the rise of CFSP provoked a significant degree of enthusiasm within 
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Brussels, the think tank world and, notably, academia. Yet, as stated above, analytical precedence should 
be given back to Europe’s national defence policies and armed forces. Not only because fully integrated 
European armed forces have failed to emerge, but also because the pendulum has swung back towards a 
national approach to defence in Europe (Keohane 2016). Finally, the transformation of European armed 
forces since the end of the Cold War has been significant. In order to reframe European defence, what 
follows is a brief presentation of the three different stages in the twofold evolution of, respectively, 
European defence integration and national transformation, and of the main drivers of change.  
 
CSDP: Emergence, Rise, Gridlock  
The foundations for the emergence of European defence integration were laid with the end of the Cold 
War. In exchange for French President François Mitterrand’s acceptance of German reunification, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to accelerate European political and monetary integration. This paved 
the way for the Maastricht Treaty and CFSP in 1993 (Sarotte, 2014: 147). The latter proved, however, to 
be largely ineffective in addressing the protracted wars in the Balkans that haunted Europe in the 1990s. 
In order to gain the capability and capacity to deal with crises in Europe and its neighbourhood, the EU 
decided – in close consultation with NATO – to move ahead with European defence integration. 
Following the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration, the 1999 Cologne Summit officially established 
ESDP by absorbing the Western European Union (WEU), which had proved ineffective despite 
resuscitation attempts after the Cold War (Howorth, 2014). 
Thereafter began the second stage and ‘golden age’ of European defence integration. The EU 
institutionalised ESDP, strengthened its military capabilities, promoted interoperability and integrated 
defence procurement, agreed on its first European security strategy (ESS) (European Council 2003), and 
launched a number of peace support and crisis management operations (Krotz and Wright, 2018). The 
European Defence Agency (EDA) was also created in 2004 to enhance capacity development and intra-
European armaments cooperation. By the mid-2000s, the enthusiasm for such developments led some 
analysts to go as far as to stress that Europe would become the next superpower and challenge American 
primacy in world politics (Reid, 2004; Leonard, 2005). This process culminated in the rebranding of 
ESDP as CSDP through the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, which entered into force in 2009 and aimed at 
streamlining the hydra-like structure that had emerged over the years (Howorth, 2014). The Military 
Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS) were integrated in the newly born EU External 
Action Service (EEAS, 2017). But despite an improved organisational functioning of CSDP, a third stage, 
marked by disillusionment, has since set in. 
With the notable exception of EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, more muscular European 
military operations have become increasingly rare (Mattelaer and Marijnen, 2014). Moreover, the 
operational record and effectiveness of the EU’s more ambitious military missions such as EUFOR RD 
Congo and EUFOR Chad/CAR have been questioned, and most European powers, as illustrated by the 
Malian crisis, have no stomach for new major EU-led military operations. The era when the EU 
optimistically launched its first military mission outside of Europe with Operation Artemis in 2003 seems 
far away, and the focus has increasingly shifted to civilian missions and capacity building (Greco, Pirozzi 
and Silvestri, 2010; EEAS, 2017b; Krotz and Wright, forthcoming; Mattelaer and Marijnen, 2014). 
Finally, largely because of the persistence of diverging national interests and threat perceptions, a 
truly integrated European defence has yet to materialise and most EU member states share a growing 
disillusionment vis-à-vis the CSDP (Menon, 2011:88). This trend has been reinforced in the aftermath of 
the 2011 intervention in Libya, undertaken within a NATO rather than a CSDP-framework (Howorth, 
2014: 137-142). In the words of Adrian Hyde-Price, “despite the progress made in institutionalising the 
CSDP, the military effectiveness and operational performance of the EU missions have been 
disappointingly poor”; they have primarily engaged “in small-scale humanitarian, training and rule of law 
operations in a largely benign, consensual environment. […] The military output of the CSDP has thus 
been very low indeed”. This leads him to ask whether the pundits’ debates surrounding the CSDP are 
“much ado about nothing” (Hyde-Price, 2018). 
To be sure, it is not impossible that the combination of Brexit, Russia’s increased assertiveness, 
the American preoccupation with China and the Asia-Pacific more generally (Green, 2017; Meijer, 2015), 
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and the Presidency of Donald Trump – who has cast doubts over US defence commitments to Europe 
– might provide a partial impetus for small and incremental steps in European defence integration. The 
2017 decision to create an EU Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff, 
tasked with the command of non-executive military CSDP missions (European Council, 2017), and other 
initiatives, including the European Defence Fund within the framework of the European Defence Action 
Plan (European Commission, 2016), the strengthening of the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ 
mechanism, or PESCO (European Council, 2017:5; EEAS 2017; Fiott, Missiroli and Tardy 2017), as well 
as the discussions around the resuscitation of the longstanding ambition of creating a common EU army 
(Juncker in Reuters, 2015), have indeed generated considerable expectations and debate among pundits 
(Kayß, 2017; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2017). But the persistence of major intra-European national 
divergences in terms of threat perceptions, the imbalances in capabilities, relative gains considerations, 
and the consequent challenges of defining a shared hierarchisation of the main security challenges and 
military tasks, shed considerable doubt on the prospect of a truly integrated European defence (Hyde-
Price, 2018; Simón, 2017a, 2017b). These factors suggest that, all the recent hype surrounding PESCO 




Transforming National Armed Forces 
Russia, as the post-cold war successor to the Soviet Union, has, by contrast, had a more significant effect 
than the European integration project on national security and defence policies in Europe. More 
generally, the evolution of the European security environment over the last three decades seems to have 
had in some ways an almost diametrically opposed effect on national armed forces to that on European 
defence integration. Whereas the absence of a major conventional threat from Russia benefited European 
defence integration in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it also led to declining national defence budgets and 
a shift away from territorial defence. Similarly, the Kremlin’s subsequent increased military assertiveness 
has led European capitals to rediscover the importance of territorial defence. Consequently, national 
defence policies and armed forces in Europe have roughly also experienced what approximates to a three-
stage process since the end of the Cold War. In this process, NATO has had an overarching influence 
acting as both a key enabler and shaper of national defence policies and military transformation in 
Europe.2  
After the withdrawal of the Red Army from Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Western Europe was left 
without a major conventional military threat (Zubok, 2007: 302-35). Moreover, the decline of Russia 
seemed to continue unabated for the remainder of the 1990s (Kotkin, 2001). The ‘unipolar moment’, 
with the United States as the sole remaining superpower, seemed confirmed (Brands, 2016; 
Krauthammer, 1990, 2002). Meanwhile, the American-backed NATO umbrella was continuously 
expanded eastwards, ahead of the future expansion of the EU (Lašas, 2010). This set the stage for the 
first transformation phase of European armed forces, which lasted until the turn of the century. Initially, 
the European powers cashed in the so-called peace dividend, and reduced their military personnel and 
equipment without fundamental strategic, doctrinal, or material reorientations. The lessons of the 1991 
Gulf War, which was a showcase for US military power and the on-going Revolution of Military Affairs 
(RMA), the subsequent Balkan Wars and the emergence of transnational threats stimulated a military 
transformation process in most European countries (Adamsky and Bjerga, 2012; Edmunds and Malešič, 
2005; Farrell and Rynning, 2010; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, 2013; Forster, 2006: Ch. 2; Futter and 
Collins, 2015; Grissom, 2006; King, 2011; Loo, 2009; Sloan, 2008: Ch. 4-5; Terriff, Osinga, and Farrell, 
2010). This led to a strategic and doctrinal shift away from territorial defence to humanitarian and peace 
support operations, further troop reductions, professionalization, the abolition of conscription (in most 
cases), increased operability, and standardisation of doctrine (Haltiner and Klein, 2002: 7-11). This 
                                                     
2 Membership of NATO, the prospect of it, or the participation in the Atlantic Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme has led to a partial convergence in the national security strategies, forces structures, and contribution to 
multinational operations (King, 2011: 62; Terriff, 2013; Terriff, Osinga and Farrell, 2010). 
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doctrinal shift went hand in hand with the emergence and expansion of the CDSP in the 1990s and 2000s 
given the latter’s focus on PSOs. 
These developments overlapped with a second phase, which began with the military interventions 
in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and continued with the resulting counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations in both countries. This first completed the shift towards expeditionary warfare (Farrell, 
Rynning, and Terriff, 2013: 6-7), and then led to what has been called a “new counterinsurgency era” 
(Ucko, 2009). As a result, the countries participating in the two invasions and/or the counterinsurgency 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq did not only rediscover and develop past counterinsurgency doctrines 
(Kilcullen, 2006), but also continued the transformation of their armed forces to enable them to fight 
alongside allies abroad. This accelerated the process of what Anthony King (2011:10) has called 
“concentration” and “transnationalisation” to create smaller yet more capable, and internationally 
connected armed forces. In an increasingly generalised trend, European armed forces were re-organised 
into a modular and thus more flexible structure, further reduced in size and professionalised, and re-
equipped with new weapons platforms and communication equipment in the aim to improve their 
reaction time, force projection capability, operational sustainability, interoperability, and effectiveness. 
Yet this transformation process was impeded by persistent budget pressures on Europe’s armed forces 
and marked by inconsistency because of different security outlooks, political priorities, and strategic 
cultures in Europe. This led to what has been called a “transformation gap”, not only between the United 
States and its European allies,3 but also within Europe (Terriff, Osinga and Farrell, 2010). Moreover, the 
enthusiasm for expeditionary warfare and COIN was not shared across the entire continent, and some 
non-allied or neutral countries, for instance, focused instead on domestic tasks as a substitute for 
territorial defence (Wyss, 2011; Agius and Devine, 2011). 
Meanwhile, the pendulum has swung back with a third and on-going transformation phase. This 
current phase, which overlapped with the second, set in following a double-crisis that emerged towards 
the end of the last decade. On the one hand, the lengthy campaign and lack of progress in Afghanistan 
led to disillusionment with COIN, and a desire to avoid having to fight an insurgency on the ground in 
the future (Ucko and Egnell, 2013, 2014). On the other, the global financial crisis was followed by cuts 
to already overstretched defence budgets (Giegerich, 2010). As a result, not only did the European 
appetite for expeditionary warfare dramatically decline, but also the capabilities and capacities of Europe’s 
armed forces were further reduced (O’Donnell, 2012; Directorate-General for External Policies of the 
Union, 2011). This ‘strategic retreat’ did not last for long, and was transformed into a ‘strategic 
reorientation’ as soon as the European economy was on its way to recovery and the continent seemed to 
be confronted with new threats and challenges. Simultaneous to a widespread disillusionment with the 
EU and a resurgence of the nation-state (Grygiel, 2016:94-101; Lequesne, 2018), many European powers 
have increasingly seen themselves challenged by a militarily resurgent and assertive Russia – especially in 
the wake of the Ukrainian Crisis and the annexation of Crimea (Matlary and Heier 2016) – together with 
an Islamist terrorist threat on their national territories (Byman, 2015), and cyber security challenges 
(Kello, 2017; Rid, 2013). Even though defence spending as a percentage of GDP remains historically low 
and often well below NATO’s two percent target, this increasingly tense European security environment 
has led to higher defence budgets after decades of cuts (Tian, Fleurant, Wezeman and Wezeman, 2017; 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015). As a consequence of these shifting threat perceptions, 
as shown below, the trend points towards a ‘renationalisation’ of defence policies and a renewed emphasis 
on territorial defence – in some cases even with a focus on domestic security. Not only the threat of 
terrorism, but also that of conventional war – as announced more than a decade ago by Colin Gray (2005) 
– is again real. This overall trend towards the renationalization of national armed forces, with a return to 
territorial defence – and mostly in the context of NATO – has contributed to further de-emphasizing 
the relative importance of CSDP in European defence and security. 
In sum, given the rise and decline in European defence integration and the persistence in the 
process of national defence transformation since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the historical evolution of, 
and recent trends in, European defence and security thus call for a renewed attention to national defence 
policies and armed forces. 
                                                     
3 On the implication of US military innovation and its ‘Third Offset Strategy’ for Europe, see Simón, 2016. 
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A Glaring Imbalance: The Literature on CSDP and National Armed Forces 
A second central reason for refocusing on national armed forces in studying European defence is that, 
in this twin movement of European integration and national transformation, the overwhelming majority 
of the literature has focused on the CSDP while largely neglecting, with only a few notable exceptions, 
the comparative evolution of national defence and security policy and armed forces at the cross-European 
level. 
Despite its very limited military output, the CSDP has been the focus of a burgeoning body of 
scholarly literature (for an overview, see Howorth, 2011; Menon, 2012; Mérand, 2008). This seemingly 
paradoxical phenomenon resulted, partly, from the enthusiasm for European defence integration in the 
wake of the rise of CSDP and the at times wishful thinking of some scholars and pundits – despite 
empirical evidence to the contrary. Yet, more importantly it also resulted from the concomitant decline 
of defence- and military-focused Strategic Studies at the expense of Security Studies, following the 
broadening of the concept of security and the focus on its non-military dimensions (Buzan and Hansen, 
2009; Krause and Williams 1996), and the consolidation of European Studies as an academic sub-
discipline (Bindi and Eliassen, 2011; Keeler, 2005; Wallace, 2000) – which jointly contributed to the 
neglect of the study of national defence policy and armed forces in Europe.  Without attempting to 
provide an exhaustive review, which goes beyond the scope of this article, it is possible to identify five 
clusters of inquiry in the literature on the CSDP. Firstly, a large body of works seeks to explain the drivers 
of the rise and evolution of the CSDP by applying theoretical approaches from political science and 
international relations. They put forward competing explanatory factors derived from realism (Art, 2004; 
Hyde-Price, 2012; Jones, 2007; Rynning, 2011; Posen, 2006), constructivism (Howorth, 2004; Kurowska 
and Kratochwil, 2012; Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Strickman, 2010), or neo-institutionalism (Hofmann, 
2011; Menon, 2011; Smith, 2004; Weiss, 2011), among others.4 A second strand in the literature analyses 
the decision-making processes and the institutional arrangements of the CSDP. This body of research 
aims to assess whether Europe’s institutional architecture in the field of defence and security is 
intergovernmental, supranational, or consists of a multilevel security governance (Howorth, 2012; 
Irondelle, Frédéric Mérand and Hofmann, 2010; Irondelle, Mérand and Hofmann, 2011; Mérand, 2012; 
Mattelaer 2014; Webber, Croft, Howorth, Terriff and Krahmann, 2004). A third cluster focuses on the 
aggregation of military capabilities under the CSDP, on intra-European arms cooperation and on the 
persistence of the so-called ‘capabilities–expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993, 1998).5 Focusing on the demand 
side, these works examine the institutional framework that has emerged over time to develop joint 
European defence capabilities, including the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement 
(OCCAR) or the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Biscop and Coelmont, 2013; DeVore, 2014; 
Giegerich and Nicoll, 2008; Jones, 2007; Reynolds, 2007; Shepherd, 2015; Trybus, 2014). The external 
operations, both civilian and military, undertaken by the European Union under the CSDP banner 
constitute a fourth major research area. These works examine the drivers and effectiveness of the range 
of operations conducted by the EU in South-Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia since the 
early 2000s (Attinà and Irrera, 2016; Greco, Pirozzi and Silvestri, 2010; Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 2009; 
Krotz and Wright, 2018 forthcoming; Engberg, 2014; Pohl, 2014; Rodt, 2014; Tardy, 2015).  
Finally, the literature delves into the contentious relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the CSDP in the provision of security on the continent. It analyses issues 
such as the potential development of Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ vis-à-vis NATO, the transatlantic 
burden-sharing and capability gap, or the question of geographical/functional division of labour – and 
more broadly the patterns of cooperation and competition – between the two organizations (Howorth, 
2014, 2017; Howorth and Keeler, 2003; Hulsman, 2000; Hunter, 2002; Lagadec, 2012, Ch. 8). While 
scholars disagree on the extent to which the EU has fully emerged as an actor in military affairs on the 
                                                     
4 For an overview of the theoretical approaches applied to Europe’s common foreign, defence and security policy, see 
Howorth, 2014: Ch. 6; Jørgensen, Aarstad, Drieskens, Laatikainen, and Tonra, 2015; Krotz and Maher, 2011; Kurowska and 
Breuer, 2012. For a critique of the lack of sufficient theorization of CSDP, see Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011. 
5 The concept of ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ refers to the discrepancy between the expectations surrounding European 
integration and Europe’s actual capabilities (Hill, 1993, 1998).  
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world stage (Biscop, 2011; Howorth, 2010; Jones, 2007; Krotz, 2009; Norheim-Martinsen, 2013; Zwolski, 
2012), these five different clusters of literature all share a tendency to focus on a trans-/supranational 
level of analysis. 
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the scholarly literature on European defence and security 
has thus adopted a predominantly ‘CSDP-centric’ perspective. Accordingly, of the two main trends that 
have characterized Europe’s defence since the end of the fall of the Berlin Wall, namely European 
integration and national transformation, the latter has been significantly neglected. Indeed, in comparison 
to the volume of the CDSP-centred literature, significantly fewer cross-national studies have analysed 
and compared the evolution of national defence policies and the transformation of their armed forces 
across Europe; and, when doing so, they have focused only on a small selection of major European 
powers, such as Britain, France and Germany – and seldom on medium or lesser powers, e.g. Poland, 
Spain or Norway (Edmunds and Malešič, 2005; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, 2013; Heuser and Shamir, 
2016:part I; Matlary and Petersson, 2013; Murray and Viotti, 1994; Terriff, Osinga, and Farrell, 2010). 
Moreover, several of these studies have focused specifically on the contributions of individual major 
powers to the CSDP, therefore using the CSDP as their organizing compass (e.g. Dyson, 2016: section 
3; Giegerich, 2008; Gross, 2011). Meanwhile, in such comparative studies, many lesser European powers 
are often absent altogether, such as Albania, Ireland or Slovakia, just to name a few. Finally, the very few 
comparative studies that include a ‘large N’ of European countries tend either to focus only on specific 
issues or aspects (e.g. strategic culture) (Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas, 2013) or to provide year-by-year 
snapshots (e.g. the annual reports IISS Military Balance or SIPRI Yearbook). 
In other words, by predominantly focusing on the CSDP, the extant literature has neglected a 
fundamental analytical dimension, namely the systematic comparison of national defence policies and 
armed forces across Europe in the post-Cold War era. This imbalance further demonstrates the need to 
move beyond a ‘CSDP-centric’ perspective and to re-emphasize the cross-European comparative study 
of national defence policies and armed forces. 
 
The Evolution of National Defence Policies in Europe: Common Patterns versus Divergences 
Giving analytical precedence to the national level in the study of European defence, and in a comparative 
perspective, allows to empirically substantiate cross-European trends as well as intra-European 
divergences in the evolution of defence policies and in the transformation of armed forces in Europe. 
This section synthesize the overall findings of a two-year long project that brought together close to sixty 
authors from around the world to provide a geographically and thematically comprehensive analysis of 
the evolution and current state of the national security and defence policies, strategies, doctrines, 
capabilities, and military operations, as well as the alliances and security partnerships of European armed 
forces, in response to the security challenges Europe has faced since the end of the Cold War (Meijer 
and Wyss 2018). As shown below, the rich and diverse portrait of the shifting patterns in European 
defence that emerges from this study contributes to the literature on military transformation (Adamsky 
and Bjerga, 2012; Edmunds and Malešič, 2005; Farrell and Rynning, 2010; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, 
2013; Forster, 2006: Ch. 2; Futter and Collins, 2015; Grissom, 2006; King, 2011; Loo, 2009; Sloan, 2008: 
Ch. 4-5; Terriff, Osinga, and Farrell, 2010) though with a broader focus. This military transformation 
literature has hitherto shown how, selectively emulating the United States, including via NATO standards 
(Dyson, 2016: ch. 1; Dyson and Konstadinides, 2013: 9-10, 38, 152-4; Forster, 2006: 69; Schmitt, 2017),6 
European armed forces have been reorganized, in the post-Cold War period, along three distinct 
innovations aimed at improving military effectiveness. These innovations have been networking forces 
through information and communications technologies; developing effects-based operations (EBOs), 
which links the destruction of targets to intended military, political, and psychological effects; and forging 
a modular and flexible force structure for expeditionary missions (Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, 2013: 8, 
64). Furthermore, it has been shown that military interventions have a feedback-loop effect on the 
transformation of national armed forces through processes of adaptation in wartime (Farrell, 2010; 
Farrell, Osinga and Russell, 2013; Harkness and Hunzeker, 2015; Murray, 2011). Refocusing the study of 
European defence on the national level can contribute to this literature by also showing subregional or 
                                                     
6 On emulation see also Cottichia, Moro (2016) and Farrell and Rynning (2002). 
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national variations. But it can also allow going beyond this literature by shedding light not only on military 
transformation but also on the broader evolution of defence policies, including threat assessments, 
decision-making institutional architectures, changing nuclear doctrines, the expansion of the mission 




Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat perceptions of the four major powers in Europe (the 
UK, France, Germany, and Russia) have expanded beyond the Cold War concerns over large-scale 
conventional warfare towards a more diffuse and diversified threat assessment, increasingly including 
asymmetrical, non-state, and transnational security challenges. However, starting in the 2010s, and in 
particular after the Ukrainian crisis and Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, the three West European major 
powers have also gradually factored Russia’s newly assertive behaviour—and the prospect of 
conventional war—back in their threat assessments. Reciprocally, Russia’s perception of continued 
Western military–technological superiority and the growing tensions over Ukraine have given new 
urgency to its sense of insecurity and encirclement (Rynning and Schmitt, 2018; Dorman, 2018; Kraft 
2018; Zysk, 2018). 
Concomitantly, the force structures of both Western major military powers and Russia have followed 
a partly similar trajectory, though with uneven capabilities and national idiosyncrasies, towards a modular, 
more flexible force structure with an emphasis on joint, network-centric forces (Futter and Collins, 2015). 
The mission spectrum of Western major powers has significantly broadened, from cold-war territorial 
defence to a crisis-management and expeditionary force, with a focus on multinational combined forces 
and interoperability. Meanwhile, France is the only major power to deploy armed forces on its national 
territory for domestic security purposes (Tenenbaum, 2016), though the United Kingdom briefly 
deployed troops in the wake of the Manchester attack of May 2017 to support police forces (Guardian, 
2017). Yet all three major West European powers appear to have responded to rising tensions with Russia 
by re-emphasizing territorial defence as a core mission, largely within a NATO framework (Rynning and 
Schmitt, 2018; Dorman, 2018; Kraft, 2018; Zysk, 2018). It is this renewed focus on territorial defence 
that has reinvigorated NATO’s traditional role as the backbone of European defence, but simultaneously 
laid bare the dramatic shortfalls in the national defence capabilities of major European military powers. 
This was, for instance, vividly illustrated by an official German report in early 2018, according to which 
less than 50 per cent of the German armed forces’ major weapons systems were ready for training or 
deployment (Deutsche Welle 2018). 
The institutional architectures governing national defence policy vary significantly across these four 
major powers, ranging from tightly centralized decision-making systems (Russia), high executive 
autonomy (the UK and, especially, France) or strong parliamentary oversight (Germany). Since the 1990s, 
Western major powers have enhanced their participation in multinational interventions ranging from 
low- to high-intensity operations (Gowan 2018; Krotz and Wright 2018; Lindley-French 2018; Zajec 
2018). Despite Germany and France’s non-participation in the Iraq War, this trend is apparent in all 
major West European powers, even in Germany, where a significant development has been the growing 
involvement in international military operations despite the domestic constraints on the use of force. 
Russia has instead tended to privilege unilateral interventions in its near abroad, as attested by her 
interventions in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and Ukraine (Sutyagin 2018). Of the three nuclear powers, the 
nuclear doctrines of France and the UK have gradually converged towards a rebalancing of the mix of 
conventional/nuclear forces in their overall defence policies in favour of conventional forces, and 
towards the acceptance of ballistic missile defences (Schmitt and Rynning, 2018: 44). In contrast, Russia 
has sought to compensate for its conventional inferiority vis-à-vis NATO by elevating the role of nuclear 
weapons in its defence policy, by abandoning the no-first-use pledge, by envisaging the possible use of 
limited nuclear strikes to de-escalate a conflict, as well as by pursuing non-military means (for example, 
cyber and electronic warfare, information campaigns, and covert operations) (Zysk 2017). While Europe’s 
major Western powers face the common challenge of how to finance defence efforts given significant 
budget and resource constraints, Moscow’s defence budget has steadily increased. This increase has 
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come, however, from a very low post-Cold War defence-spending level, and Russia’s modernization 




While the defence policies of Europe’s medium powers share several common characteristics, there have 
also been significant differences in defence outlooks across south, south-east, Central, and Eastern 
Europe.7 A shared trend since the end of the cold war appears to be the expansion of the concept of 
security in their successive national security strategy documents, with threat assessments increasingly 
including so-called non-traditional security challenges, such as terrorism, organized crime, and WMD 
proliferation. Furthermore, as with Western Europe’s major powers, this broadening of the definition of 
‘security’ has gone hand in hand with the development of the so-called comprehensive approach, aimed 
at blending all instruments of national power (civilian and military), and at enhancing cooperation 
between government departments to tackle such challenges NATO (Coticchia 2018; Michta 2018; 
Arteaga 2018; Gürsoy 2018; Polyakov 2018). Important differences in emphasis nonetheless persist in 
the hierarchization of security challenges. In particular, in contrast to southern European states—which 
continue to perceive a diffuse threat environment and focus on challenges on NATO’s southern flank 
(for example, terrorism and migrant smuggling networks)—former Soviet or Soviet-controlled Central 
and East European medium powers have come to single out Russia as their first security concern, 
increasingly after Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008, but even more so since the 2010s (Onderco, 2018). 
Given its history of recurrently falling prey to rival major powers, Poland, for instance, has consistently 
put Russia at the top of its security concerns throughout the post-cold-war period (Michta 2018). 
Ukraine’s threat perception vis-à-vis Moscow, instead, has risen and fallen multiple times since the end 
of the cold war and its independence from the Soviet Union, leading to oscillations in Kyiv’s defence 
policy between NATO and Russia—until Moscow’s aggression in eastern Ukraine and its annexation of 
Crimea have led Kyiv to move resolutely towards closer ties with (Polyakov 2018). 
Just as for the major powers, the range of missions of the armed forces of Europe’s medium powers 
has expanded to include crisis-management and peace operations since the 1990s and in numerous cases 
counterinsurgency in the 2000s, with a force structure tailored for joint and interoperable expeditionary 
operations. All these medium powers have become increasingly active in multinational operations in the 
post-cold-war era, within a UN, NATO, and/or CSDP framework or as part of ‘coalitions of the willing’ 
(Gowan 2018; Krotz and Wright 2018; Sperling and Webber 2018). Turkey, for instance, has participated 
in a variety of multinational peacekeeping operations—while also conducting unilateral operations (for 
example, Iraq and Syria)—and Ukraine has participated in peace-support operations (PSOs) as a way to 
maintain readiness (Gursoy 2018; Polyakov 2018). Italy, Portugal, and Spain have also used their armed 
forces on national soil to carry out or support homeland security missions (Coticchia 2018; Arteaga 2018). 
More recently, while south European states have been less directly affected by Moscow’s assertive 
behaviour, both Kyiv and Warsaw have re-emphasized the central task of territorial defence and 
deterrence. Within NATO, as Andrew A. Michta stresses, Poland has become a ‘vocal advocate’, together 
with other countries in Eastern and north-eastern Europe, ‘for NATO to return to its traditional 
territorial defence function’ (Michta 2018). The overall pattern towards a revaluation of territorial defence 
can also be observed among Europe’s lesser powers. 
 
Lesser Powers 
Among European armed forces, those of the lesser powers display the greatest variety in terms of defence 
policy trajectories.8 The hierarchization in their threat perceptions, the objectives of their military 
transformation processes, their propensity to use military force, or their relationship with NATO and the 
EU have been profoundly shaped by their history, their geographical location, and their surrounding 
                                                     
7 These medium powers are Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
8 These lesser powers are Austria and Switzerland, the Baltic countries, Belarus, the Benelux countries, Bulgaria and Romania, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the states of former Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway.  
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‘local’ security environment. Before we assess subregional patterns, it is possible to identify some cross-
European dynamics. 
In the first two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, virtually 
all Europe’s lesser powers—just like the major and medium powers—expanded the mission spectrum of 
their armed forces beyond territorial defence towards crisis management and tended to blend civilian and 
military instruments to address a broadened range of security challenges. Since the growing tensions with 
Russia in the 2010s, however, a general trend appears to be the return to an emphasis on territorial 
defence, though with some exceptions, as will be detailed, in south and south-eastern Europe in 
particular. A significant common challenge has been how to manage the combination of limited or 
shrinking budgets and ever more complex and diverse military tasks, especially after the financial crisis 
in the late 2000s. While this challenge has affected major and medium powers as well, it has impacted 
lesser powers more severely, given that they have fewer resources. Thirdly, what emerges from the 
comparative analysis of evolution of national defence policies in Europe is the overarching influence of 
NATO as an enabler and shaper of military transformation. Membership of NATO, the prospect of it, 
or the participation in the Atlantic Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme have led to a partial 
convergence in the national security strategies, forces structures, and contribution to multinational 
operations. Finally, while participation in international interventions significantly expanded in the 1990s 
and 2000s, it has rapidly decreased in the 2010s after the perceived failures and the financial costs of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2008 economic crisis, and Russia’s more assertive behaviour in the 
East—the combination of which has required a reprioritization of scarce resources (Andersson 2018; 
Baev 2018; Chourchoulis 2018; Ejdus 2018; Hedberg and Kasekamp 2018; Klinkert 2018; Mantovani 
and Hauser 2018; Onderco 2018; Petersson 2018; Speller 2018). 
The lesser powers in north, north-eastern, Eastern, and Central Europe have been considerably 
influenced by their history and geographical location either as former members of the Warsaw Pact or 
because of their proximity to it.9 Those countries that were Soviet Republics or members of the Warsaw 
Pact—that is in north-eastern, Eastern, and Central Europe—have experienced three broad stages in the 
evolution of their defence policies (Baev 2018; Hedberg and Kasekamp 2018; Onderco 2018). 
In the 1990s, they underwent complex transitions and a democratization processes combined, in 
most cases, with a rapprochement with NATO through the PfP programme, and their successive 
accession as members of the alliance. In this period, the acute sense of insecurity vis-à-vis Moscow drove 
the reorientation towards, and the gradual integration in, the European and transatlantic security 
architecture. Their armed forces were moulded by the Soviet Union’s cold-war influence and priorities, 
and were thus largely characterized by a focus on territorial defence and conventional warfare on the 
continent, by ageing Soviet-designed technology, and by large conscript armies. The gradual 
rapprochement with and subsequent accession to NATO translated into profound reforms, including in 
civil–military relations with the aim of depoliticizing the military. The modernization of their armed 
forces was aimed at downsizing personnel and heavy machinery and transitioning towards smaller, rapid-
reaction mobile forces capable of participating in NATO- and EU-led peace support operations. 
In the second phase, during the 2000s, these new members of NATO and the EU pursued the 
modernization of their armed forces, largely influenced by NATO standards and, to a lesser extent, by 
the EU and its 2003 European Security Strategy. Their national security strategy documents increasingly 
emphasized ‘non-traditional’ security threats, and, concomitantly, they moved towards force structures 
tailored for expeditionary warfare and crisis management. By becoming increasingly engaged in 
international operations, as Masha Hedberg and Andres Kasekamp argue, they thus reoriented their 
traditional agenda of territorial security in order to make more resources available for NATO and for EU 
mobile needs (Hedberg and Kasekamp 2018). 
By the 2010s, however, an increasingly tense regional environment, with Russia’s intervention in 
Ukraine and its assertive stance vis-à-vis the Baltics, led these lesser powers to refocus on conventional 
security threats and territorial defence and to reduce their participation in multinational interventions. 
Interestingly, there have been some exceptions to these trends. In Eastern Europe, for instance, while 
                                                     
9 These countries include Belarus, the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. 
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official documents in the Czech Republic and Slovakia reflect a rising threat perception vis-à-vis Russia, 
Hungary does not appear to have followed the same path (Onderco 2018). 
 
Northern Europe has also been characterized by national variations that are attributable in part to 
the countries’ histories before and during the cold war, and their geographical location. The two Nordic 
NATO members, Denmark and Norway, have clearly opted for the development of small, professional, 
and mobile expeditionary forces for multinational operations (Petersson 2018). The two neutral states, 
Finland and Sweden, remain outside NATO but have both moved gradually towards greater operational 
cooperation with the alliance (Andersson 2018). At the same time, while Finland has never given up its 
focus on territorial defence, Sweden moved from a conscript force tailored for territorial defence in the 
1990s to a smaller professional expeditionary force suited for PSOs in the 2000s. This process seemed 
to be confirmed with the abolition of the draft in 2010. But, in response to Russia’s military actions in its 
neighbourhood, Stockholm has shifted its focus back to territorial defence and in 2017 reinstated 
conscription (Sorensen 2017). 
 
The paths followed in south and south-eastern European states have been markedly different from 
those in the north and the east. In the first decade after the cold war, while the former members of the 
Warsaw Pact were engaging in democratic transition processes, Yugoslavia—a non-aligned country 
during most of the cold war—disintegrated into several independent states and descended into a 
prolonged, decade-long series of wars. It was only in the 2000s that the countries of what had become 
former Yugoslavia initiated a process of military modernization away from conscript, mass-mobilization 
armed forces. Croatia joined NATO and embarked on a process of transformation consistent with 
NATO standards, towards a professional, downsized force structure. Serbia, by contrast, while seeking 
greater cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance, has maintained a more ambivalent position, seeking EU 
but not NATO membership, while pursuing close ties with Russia (Ejdus 2018). 
Further south, in Greece and Albania, the threat perception has also been significantly different from 
that in other European subregions. Especially in the 1990s, the main security threat was perceived in 
Athens to come from Turkey as well as from instability in the Balkans. Accordingly, Greek armed forces 
focused on territorial defence and aimed at deterring conventional aggression. As Greek–Turkish 
tensions receded in the 2000s, Athens moved towards NATO standards, increasingly focused on ‘non-
traditional’ security challenges (for example, international crime, piracy, or terrorism), and restructured 
its military towards smaller and mobile forces. Nonetheless, the defence transformations of Greece, and 
even more so of Albania, have been hampered by considerable budgetary difficulties, especially since the 
2008 financial crisis (Chourchoulis 2018). 
The lesser powers in Western Europe have perceived a much more benign and stable regional 
environment than their counterparts in north- and south-eastern Europe since the end of the cold war. 
The Netherlands and Belgium have resolutely shifted away from traditional territorial tasks to focus, 
through PSOs and the comprehensive approach, on a diverse and more diffuse array of non-state threats. 
They also share a scepticism vis-à-vis the use of military force in international affairs. While both 
countries are members of the EU and NATO, Belgium has put more emphasis, in relative terms, on 
defence cooperation within the EU, while the Netherlands has maintained a more Atlanticist perspective 
(Klinkert 2018). 
 
Besides the sub-regional specificities in the evolution of defence policies in Europe, what emerges from 
the comparative analysis of defence policies in Europe is also what has been labelled the ‘variety of 
neutrality’ (Beyer and Hofmann 2011). The neutral lesser powers share a common legacy, originating 
from the cold war, of eschewing military alliances. However, their military transformation processes have 
been shaped by diverging threat perceptions and interpretations of what neutrality entails (Wyss 2011). 
This has led some neutral powers to cooperate mostly within the NATO and EU frameworks, while 
others have focused on domestic and homeland defence tasks. Although Finland and Sweden today face 
a tenser regional environment (Andersson 2018), the geographical locations of Austria, Ireland, and 
Switzerland have placed them far from a direct military threat since the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
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the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact Distant from potential threats on or from the continent, Ireland 
has devoted significant resources to internal security challenges, in particular in relation to the border 
with Northern Ireland (Speller 2018). Austria and Switzerland have downsized their forces and widened 
their armed forces’ mission spectrum to include disaster relief and peace missions as well as 
counterterrorism and, more recently, cyber defence, while maintaining territorial defence as the core 
mission. Belarus stands as a formally neutral country, caught in the rising tensions between NATO and 
Russia (Hauser and Mantovani 2018). In the post-cold-war period, Minsk has perceived a more benign 
regional security environment than its closest partner, Moscow, and has maintained a less confrontational 
stance vis-à-vis the West (Splidsboel Hansen 2018). In short, the content of the status of a neutral 
country, and its implications for defence policy, vary significantly across Europe. 
  
A final general trend in the evolution of defence policy in Europe since the end of the Cold War and cuts 
across major, medium, and lesser powers has been the thickening of bilateral and, interestingly, minilateral 
defence cooperation both within Europe and between European states and external countries (Attinà 
2016; Cottey 2000; Pannier 2015; Pertusot 2015; Sundberg and Ahman 2012). This pattern is partly 
consistent with Antony King’s findings on the ‘transnationalization’ of European armed forces, though 
he focuses exclusively on the tactical and operational level (King 2011:6;). The drivers of such 
developments include (in isolation or combined): the need to achieve cost efficiency through pooling and 
sharing in order to manage the combined challenge of an expanding mission spectrum and limited (if not 
shrinking) resources; the will to foster interoperability with, or within, NATO; gridlock in multilateral 
defence cooperation in Europe; and/or, in some cases, changing perceptions of the regional threat 
environment.  
In south-western Europe and the larger western Mediterranean, Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and 
Malta participate in the so-called 5+5 Defence Initiative with Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and 
Tunisia to foster cooperation in areas such as surveillance and maritime security, air security, and training 
and research (Italian Ministry of Defence 2007; Núñez 2012). Portugal, meanwhile, maintains defence 
ties with the Lusophone world through the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, which Lisbon 
considers as a third defence priority together with NATO and the EU (Arteaga 2018). 
In south-eastern Europe, minilateral initiatives include, among others, the Regional Cooperation 
Council (RCC) and the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process (RCC 2018). Also, 
trilateral political and military cooperation has developed between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel in different 
areas, such as air, naval, and aeronautical exercises. Greece and Israel have also signed a bilateral security 
cooperation agreement (Chourchoulis 2018). 
In Central Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland cooperate on training, 
education, and the development of the Visegrád Battlegroup battalion, among other things, in the so-
called Visegrád Group (also called Visegrád 4 or V4) (Kupiecki 2013; Riecker and Terlikowski 2015). The 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary have also strengthened trilateral cooperation in military sharing 
and joint procurement (Onderco 2018). 
In northern Europe, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) brings together Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—and occasionally the Baltic states—in a broad range of areas, 
such as land, sea, and air operations, logistic support, education, and research and development, among 
many others. The three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), meanwhile, have developed several 
trilateral initiatives, including a peacekeeping battalion (the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval 
Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), and the Baltic Defence 
College (BALTDEFCOL) (Saxi 2014; Westberg 2014). At the bilateral level, Finland and Sweden have 
tightened their defence cooperation, including in the areas of training and exercises and in air and 
maritime surveillance (Andersson 2018). 
In Western Europe, bilateralism trumps minilateralism. Franco-British defence and security 
cooperation occurred during the Cold War and until the late 2000s, but mostly in an ad hoc manner, 
though across the spectrum of defence sectors (such as military interventions, training and exercises, or 
armaments). It was only in the early 2010s that the bilateral defence partnership became institutionalised. 
The 2010 Lancaster House agreements bolstered defence links in different fields, most notably: training 
and interoperability through the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF); procurement and defence 
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industrial integration in the fields of complex weapons systems and unmanned aerial vehicles; 
participation in military interventions—, e.g. for example, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic; as 
well as and in the nuclear domain (Pannier 2013, 2017). In contrast, the Franco-German defence 
relationship is characterised characterized by the paradox of, on the one hand, long-standing and 
thickening institutionalisation institutionalization since the 1960s, but, on the other, persistent 
divergences in strategic posture and policy preferences in a variety of domains. This tension has resulted 
in push-and-pull dynamics in armaments cooperation, in the nuclear domain, in the cooperation between 
their armed forces (e.g for example, on the Franco-German Brigade or the Eurocorps), and in military 
interventions (Krotz and Schild 2013; Krotz and Wolf 2018). Other bilateral security initiatives include 
the establishment of the Dutch–German army corps and the Belgian–Dutch cooperation (BeNeSam) in 
the naval domain, as well as in air policing, training, and education (Klinkert 2018). 
The web of minilateral defence ties between national armed forces has thus become increasingly 
dense in post-Cold War Europe. This specific finding, and, more generally, the findings outlined above, 
not only attest to the analytical value of re-emphasizing the role of states in the study of European 
defence; they also constitute building blocks for assessing the evolution of the overall European security 
architecture since the end of the Cold War. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has shed light on the conceptual and empirical imbalance in the study of defence and security 
in Europe. Thereby, it has emphasised the need to turn the dominant, ‘CSDP-centric’ analytical lens on 
its head by giving precedence back to the national level. Without studying the national level in 
comparative perspective, it is impossible to grasp the complexities of, and divergences in, European 
defence and security. Refocusing the attention on national defence policy and armed forces in Europe 
not only allows addressing these imbalances, but it also opens up at least two major avenues for future 
research.  
Firstly, a truly cross-European comparison of the evolution of national defence policies and 
armed forces remains a glaring blind spot in the existing literature. The study of European defence and 
security would be significantly enriched through the elaboration of cross-European comparative analyses 
of national defence policies and armed forces since the end of the Cold War. By focusing not only on 
the defence policies and armed forces of the major, but also of medium and lesser European powers, 
such comparative studies would contribute to assessing the degree of convergence/divergence and of 
continuity/discontinuity in defence policies across Europe in a variety of areas, from counter-terrorism 
and counter-insurgency, to air or land warfare, cyber-defence, peacekeeping, etc. 
Secondly, giving analytical precedence back to the national level would allow exploring the 
diversity of inter-national defence and security cooperation pathways in Europe (bilateralism, 
minilateralism and multilateralism). Europe’s security architecture today consists of a complex patchwork 
of interwoven bilateral partnerships, minilateral cooperation initiatives and multilateral institutions. The 
variety and overlapping of defence cooperation configurations in Europe arguably deserve greater 
theoretical and empirical attention in the scholarly research. Examining the evolution, the key drivers, 
and the main challenges in the post-Cold War development of these multifaceted international 
cooperation pathways would help answering the question of the complementary or competing logics of 
these different types of defence and security arrangements.  
Ultimately, turning the dominant research agenda ‘upside down’ would significantly contribute 
to the future analysis and planning of European defence. In light of the rising security challenges that 
Europe faces, with Russian military assertiveness, conflicts on Europe’s periphery and its 
neighbourhoods, transnational terrorism, stretched defence budgets, and tensions within NATO over 
national contributions, it would be risky to privilege a supra-national perspective at the expense of the 
detailed comparative study of national defence policies and international defence cooperation. Only by 
doing so does it become possible to unearth, and potentially address, the impediments to a common 





This article draws on the introduction and the findings of the recently published The Handbook of European 




REMOVE ALL THE FORTHCOMING IN MEIJER-WYSS HANDBOOK 
 
 ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence: Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-
Malo, 4 December 1998)’, CVCE, 
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-
f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html. 
Adamsky D and Bjerga KI (eds) (2012), Contemporary Military Innovation: Between Anticipation and Adaptation. 
New York: Routledge. 
Agius C and Devine K (2011) Neutrality and the development of the European Union’s common security 
and defence policy: Compatible or competing? Cooperation and Conflict 46(3): 334–369. 
Andersson JJ (2018) Finland and Sweden. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence 
Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Art RJ (2004) Europe Hedges Its Security Bets. In: Paul TV, Wirtz JJ and Fortmann M (eds) Balance of 
Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Arteaga F (2018). Spain and Portugal. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence 
Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Attinà F (2016) European Propensity to Peacekeeping And Minilateralism: A Quantitative Analysis of 
Four EU Countries and ESDP Operations. Attinà F and Irrera D (eds) Multilateral Security and 
ESDP Operations. Abingdon, Routledge. 
Attinà F and Irrera D (eds) (2016) Multilateral Security and ESDP Operations. Abingdon, Routledge. 
Baev J (2018) Bulgaria and Romania. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence 
Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Beyer J. L. and S. C. Hofmann (2011) Varieties of Neutrality: Norm Revision and Decline Cooperation and 
Conflict (46) 3: 285–311. 
Bickerton C, Irondelle B and Menon A (2011) Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy. Journal for Common Market Studies 49(1): 1–21. 
Biehl H, Giegerich B and Jonas A (eds) (2013) Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies across 
the Continent. Munich: VS Verlag. 
Bindi F and Eliassen K (2011) The Development of European Integration Studies in Political Science: 
An Introduction. In: Bindi F and Eliassen K (eds) Analyzing European Union Politics. Bologna: Il 
Mulino. 
Biscop S (2011) Global Europe: An Emerging Strategic Actor. In: Mérand F, Foucault M and Irondelle 
B (eds) European Security since the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Biscop S (2016) The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics. Security Policy Brief 
75. Brussels: Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations. 
Biscop S and Coelmont J (2013) Military CSDP: The Quest for Capability. In: Biscop S and Whitman R 
(eds) The Routledge Handbook of European Security. London: Routledge. 
Brands H (2016) Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order. 
Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. 
Buzan L and Hansen L (2009) The Evolution of International Security Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Byman D (2015) Al Qaeda, The Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Chourchoulis D (2018) Greece, Cyprus and Albania. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of 
European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
 16 
Coticchia F (2018) Italy. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed 
Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Coticchia F and Moro F (2016) Learning from Others? Emulation and Change in the Italian Armed 
Forces since 2001. Armed Forces and Society 42(4): 1–23. 
Cottey A (2000) Europe’s New Subregionalism Journal of Strategic Studies 23(2): 23-47.  
Council of European Union (2016) Annex – Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Brussels, 14 
November. 
Deutsche Welle (2018) Limited Number of Weapons in German Military Ready for Action: Report. 
http://www.dw.com/en/limited-number-of-weapons-in-german-military-ready-for-action-
report/a-42752070, accessed 14 May 2018. 
DeVore M (2014) International Armaments Collaboration and the Limits of Reform. Defence and Peace 
Economics 25(4): 415–443. 
Dijkstra H (ed) (2016) Forum: the EU Global Strategy. Contemporary Security Policy 37(3).  
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union – Policy Department (2011) The Impact of the 
Financial Crisis on European Defence, Annex (Brussels: European Parliament). 
Dorman A (2018) United Kingdom. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence 
Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Dyson T (2016) Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe. New York: Springer. 
Dyson T and Konstadinides T (2013) European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and IR Theory. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Edmunds T and Malešič M (eds) (2005) Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles. Amsterdam: 
IOS Press. 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M (2017) What Future for Europe’s Security and Defense Policy? E-International 
Relations, 3 January.  
Ejdus F (2018) Serbia and Croatia. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies 
and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Engberg K (2014) The EU and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis. Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge. 
European Commission (2016) European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund, 
Press Release, Brussels, 30 November, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
4088_en.htm, accessed 16 July 2017. 
European Commission (2017) Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence. COM(2017) 315 
of 7 June. 
European Council (2003) European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted on 12-13 
December. 
European Council (2017) EU Defence Cooperation: Council Establishes a Military Planning and 
Conduct Capability (MPCC) Press statement, 8 June, accessed 3 July 2017, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/08-military-mpcc-
planning-conduct-capability.  
European Council (2017) European Council Meeting (22 and 23 June) – Conclusions. Brussels, 23 June. 
European External Action Service, CSDP Structure, Instruments, and Agencies, available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5392/csdp-structure-
instruments-and-agencies_en, accessed 15 July 2017. 
European External Action Service, Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO Deepening Defence 
Cooperation among EU Member States, Factsheet, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_09-03-2018_0.pdf, accessed 4 
December 2017. 
European External Action Service, Military and Civilian Missions and Operations, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-
civilian-missions-and-operations_en, accessed on 15 June 2017b. 
European Union (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December. 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
 17 
European Union (2016) Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels, 29 June, 
http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web.pdf.  
Farrell T and Rynning S (2010) NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War 
in Afghanistan. Journal of Strategic Studies 33(5): 673–699. 
Farrell T, Osinga F, and Russell J A (2013) Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Farrell T, Rynning S and Terriff T (2013) Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and 
the United States, 1991-2012. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Fiott D (2015) Introduction: The CSDP is Dead, Long Live the CSDP? In: Fiott D (ed) The Common 
Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Brussels: Academia Press. 
Fiott D, Missiroli A, Tardy T (2017) Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name? EUISS 
Chaillot Paper 142. 
Forster A (2006) Armed Forces and Society in Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fukuyama F (1992, 2012) The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin. 
Futter A(2015) Trident Replacement and UK Nuclear Deterrence: Requirements in an Uncertain Future. 
The RUSI Journal 160(5): 60-67. 
Futter A and Collins J (eds) (2015) Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: Transformation, Evolution and 
Lessons Learnt. New York: Springer 
German T (2017) NATO and the Enlargement Debate: Enhancing Euro-Atlantic Security or Inciting 
Confrontation? International Affairs 93(2): 291–308. 
Giegerich B (2006) European Security and Strategic Culture. National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence 
Policy. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Giegerich B (2008) European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality. London: Routledge. 
Giegerich B (2010) Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence. Survival 52(4): 87–98. 
Giegerich B and Nicoll A (2008) European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations. 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Gowan R (2018) European Involvement in United Nations Peacekeeping. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) 
The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming. 
Gray CS (2005) Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.  
Greco E, Pirozzi N and Silvestri S (eds) (2010) EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the 
Making. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali. 
Green MJ (2017) By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Grevi G, Helly D and Keohane D (eds) (2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-
2009). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. 
Grissom A (2006) The Future of Military Innovation Studies. Journal of Strategic Studies 29(5): 905–934. 
Gross E (2011) The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy Continuity and Change in European Crisis 
Management. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Grygiel J (2016) The Return of Europe’s Nation-States: The Upside to the EU’s Crisis. Foreign Affairs 5 
(September/October): 94–101. 
Guardian (2017) Soldiers on UK Streets as Threat Raised to Critical after Manchester Bombing., 29 May 
2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/23/salman-abedi-police-race-to-
establish-if-manchester-suicide-bomber-acted-alone> (accessed 14 July 2017). 
Gürsoy Y (2018) Turkey. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and 
Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Håkon H L (2014) Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO): Balancing Efficiency and Sovereignty, 
NATO and Nonalignment. In: Lepojärvi K (ed) Perspectives on European Security. Helsinki: STETE 
Yearbook, The Finnish Committee for European Security, Vol. 2013). 
Haltiner K and Klein P (2002) Europas Streitkräfte im Umbruch – Trends und Gemeinsamkeiten. In: 
Haltiner KW and Klein P (eds) Europas Armeen im Umbruch. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
 18 
Harkness K and Hunzeker M (2015) Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of 
Failure. Journal of Strategic Studies 38(6): 777–800. 
Hedberg M and Kasekamp A (2018) Baltic States. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of 
European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Heuser B (2017) Britain and the Origins and Future of the European Defence and Security Mechanism. 
The RUSI Journal 162(2): 16–23. 
Heuser B and Shamir E (eds) (2016) Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hill C (1993) The Capabilities-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role. Journal 
of Common Market Studies 31(3): 305–328. 
Hill C (1998) Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap. In: Peterson J and Sjursen H (eds) A Common 
Foreign Policy for Europe. London: Routledge.  
Hofmann S (2011) Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 49(1): 101–120. 
Howorth J (2004) Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence 
Policy. West European Politics 27(2): 211–234. 
Howorth J (2007, 2014) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Howorth J (2010) The EU as A Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain? Journal of 
Common Market Studies 48(3): 455–474. 
Howorth J (2011) The EU’s Security and Defence Policy. In: Hill C and Smith M (eds) International 
Relations and the European Union, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Howorth J (2012) Decision-Making in Security and Defense Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-
Governmentalism?. Cooperation and Conflict 47(4): 433–453. 
Howorth J (2017) EU–NATO Cooperation: The Key to Europe’s Security Future. European Security 26(3): 
454–459. 
Howorth J and Keeler J (eds) (2003) Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. 
New York: Palgrave. 
Hulsman JC (2000) A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving NATO for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: 
Heritage Foundation. 
Hunter R (2002) The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor? Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation. 
Hyde-Price A (2012) Neorealism: A Structural Approach to CSDP. In: Kurowska X and Breuer F (eds) 
Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hyde-Price A (2018) The Common Security and Defence Policy. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The 
Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2015) European Defence Spending Rises, But Well 
Short of NATO Target. Strategic Comments 21(3). 
Irondelle B, Mérand F and Hofmann S (2010) Transgovernmental Networks in European Security and 
Defence Policy. In: Vanhoonacker S, Dijkstra H and Maurer H (eds) (2010) Understanding the Role 
of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 
Special Issue 1(14)  
Irondelle B, Mérand F and Hofmann S (2011) Governance and State Power: A Network Analysis of 
European Security. Journal of Common Market Studies 49(1): 121–147. 
Italian Ministry of Defence (2007) Meeting of the Defence Ministers of The Countries Participating in 
the 5+5 Initiative. Cagliari, 9-10 December. 
Jones S (2007) The Rise of European Security Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jørgensen KE, Aarstad ÅK, Drieskens E, Laatikainen K and Tonra B (eds) (2015) The SAGE Handbook 
of European Foreign Policy. London: SAGE. 
Kaunert C, Léonard S and Dijkstra H (2012) Agenda-setting in the Common Security and Defence 
Policy: An institutionalist perspective. Cooperation and Conflict 47(4): 454–472.  
 19 
Kayß SK (2017) The Future of European Defence. International Policy Digest, 27 March. 
Keeler J (2005) Mapping EU Studies: The Evolution from Boutique to Boom Field 1960-2001. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 43(3): 551–582. 
Kello L (2017) The Virtual Weapon and International Order. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
Keohane D (2016) The Renationalization of European Defense Cooperation. In: Thränert O and Zapfe 
M (eds) Strategic Trends 2016: Key Developments in Global Affairs. Zurich: Center for Security Studies: 
9–28.  
Kienzle B and Hallams E (2017) European Security and Defence in the Shadow of Brexit. Global Affairs: 
465–469, accessed 6 June 2017, online version available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1280376. 
Kilcullen D (2006) Counter-Insurgency Redux. Survival 48(4): 111–113. 
King A (2011) The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Klinkert W (2018) Benelux Countries. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence 
Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Kotkin S (2001) Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kraft I (2018) Germany. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and 
Armed Forces. Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Krause K and Williams M (1996) Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods. 
Mershon International Studies Review 40(2): 229–254. 
Krauthammer C (1990/1991) The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Affairs 70(1). 
Krauthammer C (2002) The Unipolar Moment Revisited. The National Interest 70, Winter. 
Krotz U (2009) Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Won’t Emerge as a Full Political Actor on 
the World Stage Soon. Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3): 555–578. 
Krotz U and Maher R (2011) International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and 
Security Policy. World Politics 63(3): 548–579. 
Krotz U and Schild J (2013) Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty 
to Twenty-First Century Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Krotz U and Wolf K (2018) Franco-German Defence and Security Cooperation. In: Meijer H and Wyss 
M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming. 
Krotz U and Wright K (2018) CSDP Operations. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European 
Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Krotz U and Wright K (2018) Divided We Stand: The EU’s Global Engagement Through Military Operations and 
Civilian Missions Worldwide. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute, book monograph in preparation.  
Kupiecki R (2013) Visegrád Defense Cooperation: From Mutual Support to Strengthening NATO and 
the EU. A Polish Perspective. Center for European Policy Analysis, CEPA Report N. 35, 2 April 
2013. 
Kurowska X and Breuer F (eds) (2012) Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in 
Action. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kurowska X and Kratochwil F (2012) The Social Constructivist Sensibility and CSDP Research. In: 
Kurowska X and Breuer F (eds) Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in 
Action. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lagadec E (2012) Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Europe, America and the Rise of the Rest. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Lašas A (2010) European Union and NATO Expansion: Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Leonard M (2005) Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century. New York: Public Affairs. 
Lequesne C (2018) Brexit and the Future of EU Theory. In: Diamond P, Nedergaard P and Rosamond      
B (eds) Oxford Handbook on Brexit. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
 20 
Lindley-French J (2018) UK Military Operations. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European 
Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Loo B (ed) (2009) Military Transformation and Strategy. Revolutions in Military Affairs and Small States. New 
York: Routledge. 
Major C and Mölling C (2013) The Dependent State(s) of Europe: European Defence in Year Five of 
Austerity. In: Biscop S and Fiott D (eds) The State of Defence in Europe: State of Emergency? Brussels: 
Academia Press. 
Mantovani M and Hauser G (2018) Austria and Switzerland. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook 
of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Matlary JH and Heier T (eds) (2016) Ukraine and Beyond: Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Matlary JH and Petersson M (eds) (2013) NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mattelaer A (2014) Who is in Charge? Natural Friction in the CSDP Decision-Making Process. In: Rehrl 
J and Weisserth H-B (eds) Handbook for Decision-Makers: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the 
European Union. Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and 
Sports of the Republic of Austria. 
Mattelaer A and Marijnen E (2014) EU Peacekeeping in Africa: Towards an Indirect Approach. In: Tardy 
T and Wyss M (eds) Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Architecture. Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge.  
Meijer H (ed) (2015) Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance toward Asia: Diplomatic, Military, and Economic 
Dimensions. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) (2018) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Menon A (2011) Power, Institutions and the CSDP: The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 49(1): 83–100. 
Menon A (2012) Defense Policy. In: Jones E and Menon A (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the European 
Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mérand F (2008) European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mérand F (2012) Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action. In: 
Kurowska X and Breuer F (eds) Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in 
Action. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Meyer C (2011) The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture 
Research for the European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power. International Studies Quarterly 
55(3): 669–690. 
Meyer C and Strickmann E (2010) Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors 
Interact in European Defence. Journal for Common Market Studies 49(1): 61–81. 
Michta A (2018) Poland. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and 
Armed Forces. Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Murray D and Viotti P (eds) (1994) The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Murray W (2011) Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norheim-Martinsen PM (2013) The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Núñez M A R (2012) 5+5 Initiative: Mediterranean Security, Shared Security. Spanish Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IEEE), 6 June 2012. 
O’Donnell CM (ed) (2012) The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members. 
Washington, DC: Center on the United States and Europe and Brookings, July. 
Onderco M (2018) Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook 
of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Onderco M (2018) Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of 
European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
 21 
Pannier A (2013) Understanding the Workings of Interstate Cooperation in Defence: An exploration 
into Franco- British Cooperation after the Signing of the Lancaster House Treaty. European 
Security 22(3): 540-558. 
Pannier A (2015) Le ‘minilatéralisme’ : une nouvelle forme de coopération de défense. Politique Etrangère 
1 (March): 37–48. 
Pannier A (2017) The Anglo-French Defence Partnership after the ‘Brexit’ Vote: New Incentives and 
New Dilemmas. Global Affairs 2(5): 481-490. 
Pertusot V (2015) European Defence: Minilateralism is Not the Enemy. In: Fiott D (ed) The Common 
Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Brussels: Academia Press. 
Petersson M (2018) Denmark and Norway. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European 
Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Pohl B (2014) EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, Purpose and Domestic Politics. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Polyakov L (2018) Ukraine. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and 
Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Posen B (2006) European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity? Security Studies 
15(2): 149–186. 
Regional Cooperation Council (2018) RCC and Regional Initiatives and Task Forces in South East 
Europe. Available at http://www.rcc.int/pages/35/rcc-and-regional-initiatives-and-task-forces-
in-south-east-europe#!prettyPhoto (accessed 9 January 2018) 
Reid TR (2004) The United States of Europe. The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy. New York: 
Penguin Press.  
Reuters (2015) Juncker Calls for EU Army, Says Would Deter Russia’, Reuters, 8 March. 
Reynolds C (2007) Military Capability Development in the ESDP: Towards Effective Governance? 
Contemporary Security Policy 28(2): 357–383. 
Rid T (2013) Cyberwar Will Not Take Place. London: C. Hurst & Co. 
Rieker P and Terlikowski M (2015) The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security: 
NORDEFCO and the V4. Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) Policy Paper 25 (127). 
Rodt AP (2014) The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Rynning S (2011) Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies 
49(1): 23–42. 
Rynning S (2014) Rise and Decline of EU Security and Defense Policy. International Studies Review 16(4): 
684–686. 
Sarotte ME (2009, 2014) 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe. Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
Schmitt O (2017) French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking Inward or Outward? Journal 
of Strategic Studies 40(4): 577–99.  
Schmitt O and Rynning S (2018) France. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence 
Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Shepherd A (2015) EU Military Capability Development and the EDA: Ideas, Interests and Institutions. 
In: Karampekios N and Oikonomou I (eds) The European Defence Agency: Arming Europe. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Simón L (2016) The “Third” US Offset Strategy and Europe’s “Anti-Access” Challenge. Journal of Strategic 
Studies, available at http://dx.doi: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1163260. 
Simón L (2017a) Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe’s Relative Gains Dilemma. Security Studies 
26(2): 185–212. 
Simón L (2017b) Don’t Believe the Hype about European Defense. War on the Rocks. 27 June 2017, 
https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-believe-the-hype-about-european-defense, accessed 
21 July 2017.  
Sloan E (2008) Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 22 
Smith M (2004) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sorensen M S (2017) Sweden Reinstates Conscription, With an Eye on Russia. The New York Times, 2 
March 2017. 
Speller I (2018) Ireland. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed 
Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Sperling J and Webber M (2018) NATO Operations. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of 
European Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Splidsboel Hansen F S (2018) Belarus. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence 
Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Sundberg A and Ahman T (2012) The Two of Us: Bilateral and Regional Defence Cooperation in 
Europe. Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI Memo 4149, October. 
Sutyagin I (2018) Russia. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and 
Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tardy T (2015) CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security? Chaillot Paper 134. Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies.  
Techau J (2016) The EU’s New Global Strategy: Useful or Pointless? Carnegie Europe, 1 July, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63994.  
Tenenbaum E (2016) La Sentinelle égarée? L’armée de Terre face au terrorisme. IFRI Focus stratégique 
68 (June)    
Terriff T (2002) US Ideas and Military Emulation in NATO, 1989–1994. In Farrell T and Terriff T (eds) 
The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.   
Terriff T (2013) “Déjà vu all over again”: 11 September 2001 and NATO Military Transformation. In: 
Hallams E, Ratti L and Zyla B (eds) NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Terriff T, Osinga F and Farrell T (eds) (2010) A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European 
Military Change. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Tian N, Fleurant A, Wezeman PD and Wezeman ST (2017) Trends in World Military Expenditure 2016. 
SIPRI Fact Sheet. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, April. 
Tow WT and Taylor B (eds) (2013) Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending 
Cooperation. New York: Routledge. 
Trybus M (2014) Buying Defence and Security in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ucko DH (2009) The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars. Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Ucko DH and Egnell R (2013) Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Ucko DH and Egnell R (2014) On Military Interventions: Options for Avoiding Counterinsurgencies. 
Parameters 44(1): 11–22.  
Wallace H (2000) Studying Contemporary Europe. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2(1): 
95–113.  
Webber M, Croft S, Howorth J, Terriff T and Krahmann E (2004) The Governance of European Security. 
Review of International Studies 30(1): 3–26.  
Weiss M (2011) Transaction Costs and Security Institutions: Unravelling the ESDP. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Westberg J (2018) The New Dynamics of Nordic Defence Cooperation. In: Lepojärvi K (ed) Perspectives 
on European Security. Helsinki: STETE Yearbook, The Finnish Committee for European Security, 
Vol. 2013). 
Wyss M (2011) Military Transformation in Europe’s Neutral and Non-Allied States. The RUSI Journal 
156(2): 44–51. 
Zubok VM (2007, 2009) A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel 
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.  
 23 
Zwolski K (2012) The EU as an international security actor after Lisbon: Finally a green light for a holistic 
approach? Cooperation and Conflict 47(1): 68–87. 
Zajec O (2018) French Military Operations. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European 
Defence Policies and Armed Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
Zysk K (2017) Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Evolving Military Doctrine. Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 73(5): 322-327. 
Zysk K (2018) Russia. In: Meijer H and Wyss M (eds) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed 
Forces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
